Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty

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1. Phenomenologists and Brentanists

The philosophy of Franz Brentano and of those who shared his philosophical sympathies did not play a prominent role in Germany around the turn of the century. Brentano's reluctance to publish the results of his investigations was one reason for this. But another, more important, factor was the predominance in Germany of Neo-Kantianism, the transcendental aspirations of which were foreign to the Brentanian style of thought. When, one or two decades later, Neo-Kantianism was superseded by phenomenology, this new trend, too, developed somewhat outside the channels of Brentanist thought. On the one hand, the Husserlian movement was generally seen as an entity in its own right rather than as a development of Brentanian insights. Did not Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) end with a sharp criticism of Brentano and of 'a whole series of scholars who are scientifically close to him'?[1] Moreover Husserl himself was very soon to take his own transcendental turn which, in drawing him closer to Neo-Kantianism, loosened still further his ties to the Brentano school.

The Brentanist who fared worst at Husserl's hands is undoubtedly Anton Marty. In 1897 Husserl had publicly praised the 'acuteness, clarity and thoroughness' of Marty's thought as something which 'abounds with stimulating ideas',[2] and the *Logical Investigations* accordingly made use of Marty's early distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic signs.[3] In 1904, however, Husserl becomes more critical. He concedes that a true scholar 'may not overlook Marty's sound investigations' on the nature of judgment.[4] But for his own part he comes to the conclusion that he 'must

[1] *Husserliana* XIX/2, 758. In his 'Memories of Franz Brentano' of 1919 Husserl states that 'it was not my lot to remain a member of his school' (*Husserliana* XXV, 313).

[2] *Husserliana* XXII, 136.

[3] *Husserliana* XIX/1, 136.

[4] *Husserliana* XXII, 258.

K. Mulligan (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics, 197–214.
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judge all this to be untenable.'[5] In 1910 Husserl reviewed Marty's *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik* of 1908, insisting repeatedly upon 'the serious objections which I could raise against almost every point' regarding the Brentanist theory of judgment.[6] And finally in the revised edition of the *Logical Investigations* of 1913 he calls Marty's criticism of the first edition 'basically wrong'.[7]

The early Munich phenomenologists, in contrast, adopted a much more favourable stand toward Brentano and his followers. This attitude (which is of course in line with their general opposition to all that is of a transcendental bent) was no doubt inspired by Johannes Daubert (1877–1947).[8] Already in early 1902 Daubert had come across Husserl's recently published *Logical Investigations*, and after a thorough study of the work — to him a *Stahlbad*[9] — had come to the conclusion that it represented a type of inquiry peculiarly congenial to his own cast of mind. He then introduced the book as basic text to his fellow students in Munich, among whom I will mention here only Adolf Reinach.[10] Up to World War I Daubert remained a leader of Munich phenomenology, influencing his friends above all through numerous discussions and lectures. Husserl, too, had held Daubert in high esteem ever since their first meeting in June 1902. And while Daubert never published anything, he nevertheless committed his ideas to paper, and his manuscripts, which are today deposited in the Bavarian State Library in Munich under the sigil *Daubertiana*, provide a rich source of information about his philosophy.[11]

Daubert's manuscripts document how he had been fascinated from the very beginning by, as he expresses it, 'Husserl's brilliant analyses'.[12] But for

[5] *Ibid.*, 254.

[6] *Ibid.*, 265.

[7] *Husserliana* XIX/1, 349. Husserl's relation to Marty has not yet been investigated. One of the functions of the few remarks above is to point out the desirability of such a closer study.

[8] On Daubert's significance see the testimonies collected in my 'Structuring the Phenomenological Field: Reflections on an Daubert Manuscript', in William Hamrick (ed.), *Phenomenology in Practice and in Theory*, Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht — Boston — Lancaster 1985, 3ff.

[9] I.e. a chalybeate bath. Quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague — Boston — London 1982, 169.

[10] See Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, 'Adolf Reinach (1887–1917): An Intellectual Biography', in Kevin Mulligan (ed.), *Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht — Boston — Lancaster 1987, 3–27.

[11] For a survey of Daubert's life and of his manuscripts see Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, *Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*, Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1975, 125–138.

[12] Daubertiana A I 6/25r, a manuscript almost certainly written in 1902. In quoting Daubert's MSS I will give the signature of the convolute followed, after a diagonal stroke, by page number and recto-verso-indication. Only half of Daubert's MSS have been paginated thus far. References to unpaginated convolutes will give Daubert's own (German) title of the page in question. Quotations from the MSS will be given in English translation.

all this, he never became a mere uncritical follower of Husserl. This is exemplified also by his attitude towards the Brentanists. Daubert was first of all thoroughly familiar with Brentano's works. And as early as 1904 he was criticizing Husserl for his 'partially misguided interpretations of Brentano' in the *Logical Investigations*.[13] And concerning his own projects Daubert noted that his investigations 'are in a large measure to follow Brentano'.[14]

This independence of mind characterizes also Daubert's attitude towards Marty. Only one Martian work was however studied by Daubert in great detail: the sequence of seven long articles *Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie* which Marty had published in 1884 (articles I to III) and in 1894/1895 (articles IV to VII) in the journal *Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie*.[15] Under the common denominator of 'subjectless sentences' Marty included both impersonal statements ('it's raining') and existential ones ('there is a tree there', 'phlogiston does not exist', 'fire!'). For both classes of statements seem not to fit into the classical two-membered subject-predicate scheme. Marty's special interest in subjectless sentences derived from the fact that they seemed to yield a clear confirmation of the Brentanist doctrine of judgment. All judgments, Brentano had said, are logically reducible to existential judgments. A sentence of the grammatical form 'the tree is green' must, Brentano held, be reconstructed logically as 'the green tree exists', the sentence 'it's raining' as 'rain exists', etc. This implies that it is essential to a judgment that some existence be affirmed (or rejected), and not that two ideas or concepts be tied together by means of a copula.[16] Subjectless sentences can therefore be used to underline the correctness of this Brentanist doctrine.

Traditional logicians, in contrast, encountered great difficulties when trying to understand the nature of such utterances. If a judgment is of necessity to contain a subject and a predicate, then a one-membered judgment is incomplete, and it is the logician's task to look around for the missing member. Daubert's teacher Theodor Lipps in Munich had argued that subjectless sentences must be such as to be supplemented by elements contained in the total actual consciousness of the judger. 'There is a tree there', for example, might mean 'the tree stands in the garden'; 'fire!' might mean 'the house is burning' and so on.[17]

In 1899 Daubert accepted Lipps' suggestion that he write a dissertation on

[13] Letter to Fritz Weinmann, published in Barry Smith, 'Materials towards a history of speech act theory', in Achim Eschbach (ed.), *Karl Bühler's Theory of Language*, John Benjamins: Amsterdam 1988, 132.

[14] A I 6/12r. See also my 'Brentano und die Münchener Phänomenologie', *Brentano Studien* I (1988), 100–102.

[15] Originally published in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie* 8 (1884), 6–94, 161–192, 292–340; 18 (1894), 320–356, 421–471 and 19 (1895), 19–87, 263–334.

[16] Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Duncker & Humblot: Leipzig 1874, 279ff.

[17] Theodor Lipps, *Grundzüge der Logik*, Leopold Voss: Leipzig 1893, 52–56.

the awareness of reality.[18] He thereby found himself drawn into the dispute as to the nature of existential judgments, particularly with regard to those which affirm the existence of some *real* object. In the summer of 1902 he wrote a number of manuscripts (now scattered about various convolutes) on one-membered judgments, in which he mainly discussed the theories of Lipps, Husserl, of Christoph Sigwart,[19] and above all of Anton Marty.

2. Marty on Subjectless Sentences

Before entering into a discussion of Daubert's reaction to Marty, it is expedient to give a survey of Marty's argument in this series of articles, insofar as they are relevant here.[20] Marty's theme, to begin with, is not simply the topic of subjectless sentences, in the sense of sentences expressing existence ('there is a tree there', but also 'there are reasons to believe p') and of impersonal sentences ('it's raining', 'it hungreth me'). His interest extends also, as the title of his articles indicates, to 'the relation of grammar to logic and psychology'. In the first article he shows that there exists no essential parallelism between any given judgment and its linguistic formulation. Most sentences, when intimating a judgment, do not simply express its content, but also, among other things, the way we feel about the matters in question. For natural languages have not been devised for the sake of rendering theoretical thought. Applying this insight to impersonalia and existentialia, Marty argues that their grammatical simplicity — the fact that they seem to lack either a subject or a predicate — should not be taken to imply that they do not express judgments at all. Yet nor, either, should it be taken to imply that they give incomplete expression to judgments of a more complex form. Rather, they give expression to judgments whose matter is itself one-membered. Marty's second article concludes from this that Brentano was right in locating the essence or form of a judgment in the moment of acceptance or rejection of a given (be it one-membered, be it two-membered) content.

Marty's doctrine that there exist one-membered judgments carries the implication that the verb 'is' in existential judgments does not function as a predicate with a special content. To try to salvage the old doctrine of the necessary two-memberedness of judgments by affirming that 'being' is a true predicate, is to overlook the fact that the term 'being' conceals two radically different meanings. 'To be' on the one hand means to be real, and reality is

[18] As may be gathered from what was said above, this project never materialized in a definitive form.

[19] Sigwart had published in 1888 a booklet on *Die Impersonalien* attacking Marty's views as expounded in the first three articles on *Subjectless Sentences* of 1884; Marty in turn reacted to Sigwart in his own subsequent articles, especially in the fourth (see below).

[20] Since the exact wording of Marty's text is generally of secondary relevance from Daubert's point of view, I will generally indicate only the respective article number when referring to Marty's ideas, without giving the full bibliographical references.

an abstract element common to all real things. Reality is the opposite, e.g., of possibility or impossibility, and it has the connotation also of existing now, as contrasted with what is past or future. On the other hand 'to be' means to exist, and this concept of existence is, in contrast to that of reality, not obtained by abstraction, but by reflection upon acts of judgment. Existence in this sense signifies that some objective content is to be accepted in a correct judgment. Everything that is correctly believed to be true, exists in this sense. Even unreal things (e.g. possibilities or numbers) must thus be said to exist.

This prompts some interesting remarks on the relations of predicates to their subjects. In a general judgment like 'snow is white' we neither affirm the existence of snow nor of something white. This judgment is in fact from the Brentanian point of view such as to have a negative meaning. The judgment states that there exists no non-white snow.[21] Not only general negative judgments, but also particular ones like 'Socrates is not ill' say nothing about the existence of a Socrates, but only that there exists no Socrates-who-is-ill.[22] Predicates of the type 'ill' or 'white' neither imply nor exclude the existence of their subject. They leave this subject untouched, but add to its content in a significant way: they are *attributes*. Marty correspondingly distinguishes between attributive and modifying predicates. The latter declare that a subject which could exist, is in fact non-existent.[23] To say 'the centaur is an invention of the poet' is not to attribute to any centaur a property, but to state that the centaur exists only in the poet's imagination, or more precisely, to state of the poet that he invents a certain fiction. In such cases the grammatical subject (centaur) differs from the logical one (poet). Moreover the two-membered judgment (the centaur — is an invention) turns out to be a one-membered existential judgment (there exist centaur-inventing poets). The subject of the grammatical sentence, the centaur, which taken by itself may or may not refer to an existent, is changed by the predicate into a non-referring term. All such predicates do not add to their subject, but rather declare its non-existence.

In his third article Marty declares that one and the same logical content can be expressed in a variety of ways, according to the different 'concomitant presentations' which surround this content. Such presentations may function as mere verbal ornaments. However, they may also be such as to facilitate communication. The use of certain types of expression can help the speaker to transmit to a hearer the ideas he has in mind. Marty calls these relatively

[21] Marty follows here the early Brentanian doctrine as expounded in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, 285.

[22] In his fourth article Marty retracts this analysis by introducing the later Brentanian doctrine of *Doppelurteile*. The judgment 'A is B', according to this new view, includes two judgments: 'A is' and 'A B is' and 'A is not B' will similarly include the two judgments 'A is' and 'A not-B is'. Even a negative judgment about Socrates will therefore imply an acknowledgement of his existence.

[23] This distinction, too, goes back to Brentano's *Psychologie*, 286ff.

well-fixed means of expression the 'inner forms of language', a term he takes over from Wilhelm von Humboldt.

In his fourth article Marty returns to the topic of impersonal sentences. Sigwart had interpreted them as expressing 'denominating judgments'. Thus 'it rains', for Sigwart, is equivalent to 'this there is rain'. The 'this there' is supposed to designate a certain content of our perception. This first member then becomes classified under a general concept ('rain'). Such a reduction of impersonalia to two-membered judgments is however, Marty argues, impossible. For classifications of the given sort form no constitutive element of the judgments expressed. Consider a sentence whose subject would be 'someone whose name I do not want to reveal'. This very expression implies that the speaker knows how to denominate the person in question. Yet his utterance is understandable also to others who do not have this denomination at their disposal. Clearly, therefore, only such elements can belong to the 'fixed meaning' of a sentence which are present both to the hearer's and the speaker's mind. Now there are some exceptional cases in which an impersonal formula does indeed express a denominating judgment in Sigwart's sense. When someone looking at the sky sees that it is red and exclaims 'there's a fire!' he could initially have wondered whether or not what he sees is the glow of the setting sun and only then have reached the conviction that 'what I see here is fire'.

Marty's fifth and seventh articles, too, are mainly devoted to the refutation of various competing views on impersonalia and existentialia. But in the sixth article he refines his doctrine of predicates. After having repeated the distinction between attributive (or, as he calls them now, 'real') and modifying or non-real predicates, Marty goes on to add a third class: the *aorista* or undetermined predicates. Like real predicates, these leave their subject unchanged. But they resemble the non-real predicates also in that they do not add anything new to their subject. Examples given by Marty are 'good', 'advisable', 'plausible'. Such predicates express what one might call our psychic attitude towards the subject in question, the stand we take towards it. It is therefore not surprising that Marty now declares that the concept of existence (which he had previously characterized as expressing the relation of a positive judgment to a given content) also belongs to this third class of *aorista*. With this new doctrine Marty is in a position to reconcile conflicting views about the predicate of existence. He affirms with Descartes and Spinoza that existence is indeed a predicate — it expresses our acknowledgement of a content — but he can also subscribe to the Gassendian and Kantian view that it does not add anything to a content to which it is applied.

3. Daubert's Discussion of Marty

One can distinguish three stages in Daubert's reaction to Marty. In the first place, he makes use of some of Marty's insights and develops them in his

own way. This is followed by two phases of criticism. In the first, Daubert compares Marty's declared programme and results with the actual manner in which he goes about his work. This leads him to the conclusion that in some important respects Marty does not live up to his own purported doctrines. In a third step Daubert then resorts to the tools and insights of his own phenomenology and with their help sets forth the shortcomings of Marty's views.

Daubert's development of Marty's doctrines is based on his agreement with a basic tenet of Marty (and indeed of Frege, for that matter) as to the mutual independence of logic and grammar. Impersonal sentences are for Daubert, as for Marty, not logically enigmatic entities. Rather they are a grammatical peculiarity of certain languages. As Daubert puts it: 'The logical and the grammatical subject do not always coincide; and from this results the difficulty, whether one is to call these judgments subjectless or predicateless.'[24]

This diversity of the fields of logic and of grammar has important consequences. To begin with, one and the same sentence may reflect different judgments. Daubert even goes so far as to assert that it may express, on different occasions, either a one-membered or a two-membered judgment. 'When uttering the words 'it's lightning' one may on one occasion perform the judgment 'this (the flash seen) is lightning', and one may also want to state by this simply the fact of lightning.'[25] In his fourth article Marty, too, had insisted upon this polyvalence of impersonal sentences, but had restricted it to exceptional cases. With Daubert's insistence on this gap between the logical and the grammatical form the point of the polemic between Marty and Sigwart is considerably diminished. One and the same sentence may express an impersonal or a 'denominating' judgment, and there is no point in trying to reduce the one to the other.

What really counts in the distinction between one-membered and two-membered judgments is not their grammatical clothing, nor any psychic meanderings which may have triggered off the judgment in the speaker, nor the sketchy (e.g. visual) images which they may produce within the hearer who tries to understand what has been uttered. What really counts is, rather, the differences in the respective *meanings* embedded in these judgments:[26]

> The issue is not what things look like within us when we perform a judgment which corresponds to a grammatical sentence like 'it's raining'. Whether, at a given moment, and guided by uncontrollable associations, we think the 'it' in a very anthropomorphic way[27] or not, is something that will always differ individually. I

[24] A I 10, 'Zum Vortrage' (it is not clear which *Vortrag* this title refers to).

[25] A I 6/15v.

[26] In this regard Daubert takes over Husserl's anti-psychologism and his determination of meanings as idealities as worked out in the *Logical Investigations*.

[27] Here Daubert has in mind such explanations as that of the Latin phrase *pluit* (it rains) which should be an abbreviation for *Jupiter pluit* (Jupiter makes it rain).

> can think the meaning of the affirmation 'it's raining' in different ways, and by using different presentations in consciousness: now as 'rain exists'[28] and on other occasions as 'the cloud is raining'[29] or 'this is rain'.[30] I can possibly have these things or still many others in mind when I say: 'it's raining' . . . But this is not the issue . . . The question is rather: Are there one-membered judgments?[31]

This is of course close to Marty, but it strikes out also in new directions. In fact Daubert uses here Marty's concept of 'inner forms of speech' in order to subsume under it the various logical explanations of subjectless sentences. Marty had introduced this concept in order to bridge the gap between the speaker and the hearer, i.e. in order to describe the psychic factors involved in the process of communication. The inner form is an accident usually associated with the intimation of the judgment, where the judgment's *meaning* is something transcending any mechanism of communication.[32] Daubert clearly subscribes to this distinction. But he still tends to keep meaning and communication together in that he sees the explanation of the former and the forms of the latter as needing to be given in parallel. This can be read in two ways. On the one hand, Daubert suggests that the traditional interpretations of impersonalia do not go beyond the accidental and in some sense superficial phenomena of grammar. Such views move on the level of psychological fact, not on that of logic. The various psychological interpretations need not exclude each other, because they refer to what in the given circumstances is or is not the case. What counts, however, is exclusively the nature of the judgment and of the logical elements it contains.

Yet here, too, Daubert goes beyond Marty's Brentanist notion of a 'content' or matter of judgment. This notion runs together the content of the act of judging with that which it is supposed to be about.[33] Daubert however, moving along the lines of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, is convinced that 'it is indispensable to make, following Husserl, a clear distinction between the object, the content and the meaning of an act.'[34] When the content of an act is a real part of it and therefore like the act itself something psychic and empirical, the meaning instantiated by this act is, in contrast, something ideal and non-psychic.

[28] This is Brentano's interpretation of impersonalia.

[29] Lipps' interpretation.

[30] Sigwart's interpretation.

[31] A I 6/14r.

[32] For Marty, meaning involves a relation of similarity obtaining between mental events which take place in the speaker, and the corresponding events occurring in the hearer. For Husserl and, following him, Daubert, meaning is an ideal unit or species which becomes instantiated and realized in individual psychic acts.

[33] On contents of judgment and states of affairs in Brentano, Marty, Husserl and Daubert see Barry Smith, *Sachverhalt. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Salzburg 1988, 13–19.

[34] A I 6/12v.

This rethinking of Marty's doctrine within a Husserlian framework has certain consequences for the distinction proposed by Marty between existence and reality. In a first move, Daubert simply takes this distinction over. Thus he writes: 'The awareness of the existence of a possibility or a mathematical relation is phenomenologically different from the awareness of something real (cf. Brentano and Marty).'[35] Indeed, 'there are' certain things which are possible, and 'there are' certain relations holding between '2 + 2' and '4'. Both are affirmed in judgments, yet neither of them is a real thing given in perception. Now in view of the Husserlian distinction between real acts (including their act-contents) and ideal meanings Daubert has to rearrange these concepts. Existence, Marty had said, is a sort of necessitation that springs from a content as soon as we reflect upon it. When relating such a content to a possible judgment about it we see that we are to acknowlege it. Existence implies a necessity which is rooted in something objective, but it comes to the fore only if this content is brought in contact with acts of judging. Because of its non-psychic roots, however, Daubert argues that existence must be a kind of exclusively *objective* element which in turn generates the necessity our judging acts are subject to. This objective element, he is convinced, can only be the very state, nature or character of the object itself. Marty is correct in rejecting the idea that existence (and the necessity it is founded upon) might be something like a property or accident of the *object* taken as such (so that one could express this necessity, e.g., in terms like 'the necessary 4'). But he overlooks the fact that these features pertain to the very *state of affairs* the object is involved in. Therewith, according to Daubert, everything depends on the given state of affairs. It is no longer relevant whether the object as such is, in Marty's terminology, something real or non-real. As Daubert puts it:

> The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles: the nature of the triangle, which is nothing real, necessitates me to think the sum of its angles as being equal to two right ones. The paper which lies in front of me necessitates me to think it as being white; my memory necessitates me to think that yesterday I saw Mr. X. The common feature in all these cases is the 'being so and so' of the object of my judgment which is necessitating me. This is not up to my discretion; one cannot change it. It is this character of objectivity, no matter whether the object is real or merely appears subjectively to be so, and whether it can be presented intuitively or not, which necessitates me to adjoin the P to the S.[36]

This may look as if Daubert intends to reduce all characteristics of judgments to characteristics of their objects, a procedure which seems to presuppose a luxuriant ontology of the Meinongian sort. But the import of Daubert's point

[35] A I 4/107r. This remark, which was clearly written with Daubert's dissertation project (on the awareness of reality) in mind, is repeated elsewhere in his manuscripts: 'A mathematical relation is after all not a relation between real things, and a mere possibility is not yet thereby a reality: see Brentano and Marty.' (A I 4/111v).

[36] A I 19, 'Brentano und seine Schule'.

is only that existence is not merely a character we become aware of in the spontaneity of a reflection upon certain acts of judgment. The source of 'existence' is rather to be located entirely within the orbit of the object itself. This does not mean, however, that judgments simply mirror or present an object as it stands. Consciousness and psychic acts are not put out of action. It is, however, not the object taken as such which validates and directs the judgment, but rather the object's being thus or so. And this is precisely that in the object which is grasped, circumscribed or delimited by psychic acts turned toward it. But, against Marty, this grasping is supposed to take place in a single straightforward move, not in some type of reflection. Of course, Daubert says,

> we do not have first the object before us which presents itself to us with its character of objectivity, and then in reflection on it attribute objective validity to our statement. For the consciousness of the objective validity of our adjoining P to S, of the relation between S and P, is nothing other than the character of objectivity pertaining to S, which after all makes itself felt only insofar as I think it in relation to P. This character makes itself felt exclusively in relation to P and does not obtain for S insofar as it can be thought in any relation whatsoever.[37]

This also contains one more hint at Daubert's view on judgments and their correlates. A judgment does not consist of a subject picturing some object given to us, to which we add a predicate describing some property of this object. The judgment rather contains an S-as-related-to-P, an S *qua* P, and correlatively it does not refer to objects or even substances and their accidents, but rather to complexes into which objects with their properties may, or may not, fit, but into which there may be fitted also, e.g.,events with their moments, concepts with their characteristics, and so on.

4. Shortcomings in Marty

Daubert adopts Marty's concept of existence, then, only to remodel it by shifting its focus from reflection to the realm of immediate grasping. He feels entitled to do so, because he is thereby able to extend its reach in such a way as to have it embrace also, for example, mathematical existence. Now it is one of the peculiarities of such relations, as exemplified by, say, an algebraic equation or a theorem in geometry, that they already in themselves possess a form similar to that of judgment. Their existence cannot consist in some relation to another judgment which would lie outside them and become united to them only accidentally. This existence is rather to be looked for in the very relations themselves. This indeed exemplifies Daubert's general conclusion that existence is a character pertaining to the realm of the objects and not, as Marty has it, to the object's relation to acts of judging.

[37] *Ibid.*

For Marty the concept of existence presupposes genetically a presentation or idea of an object to which our reflections are then added. From a structural point of view, existence implies an act of judging or acknowledging. Already it seems difficult to interpret the existence of mathematical objects in this way, to say nothing of the concrete object of the material world. But, as Daubert points out, the scheme breaks down completely in those cases where the object itself exists only by virtue of its being related to given psychic acts, e.g. in the case of objects of imagination:

> When I think through the presentation of the centaur with regard to the question of actual reality, this reflection necessitates me to judge that the centaur does not exist. It is the character of objectivity of this presentation which does not allow me to attribute real being to it. But if one now says: 'The existence of the centaur necessitates me to deny its real being', one can do so, to be sure, if one has the correct sense just mentioned in mind. But hereby one does much violence to one's linguistic instinct and exposes oneself to misunderstandings (to which Marty himself later succumbs).[38]

With this last remark Daubert is probably alluding to Marty's reinterpretation, in his sixth article, of existence as an *aoriston* predicate. In the same article, also, Marty was to recant his earlier statement that unreal things could exist. All this shows to Daubert that Marty's concept of existence is neither firmly delineated nor, for that matter, clearly distinguished from his concept of reality. Moreover this concept is insufficient, as it does not permit any enlargement beyond the range of physical and psychic phenomena.[39]

Thus Marty's theory is not flexible enough to deal with the various types of objects and their relations, the pluriform logical structures of judgments about them, and the diversity of their grammatical expressions. Marty seeks, rather, to mark out certain general distinctions, and then, in order to adapt the descriptively ascertainable facts to them, he is forced to confine himself to just a few of the more superficial aspects of the matters in question. More concretely this means — and Daubert underlines this time and again — that notwithstanding his praiseworthy programme Marty sticks sometimes to grammar and grammatical form where he should expound the logical form of a judgment. This is in fact the unnoticed premise which underlies some of Marty's arguments. Alluding to the full title of Marty's articles ('On Subjectless Sentences and on the Relation of Grammar to Logic and Psychology') Daubert writes:

> In spite of the assertion that the logical and psychological essence of judgment differ from its linguistic and grammatical expression, people still always depend on

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] It is interesting to remark that it was Marty's realisation of these defects which in later years made him revise his earlier doctrine of unreal existence in a much more sophisticated way, as is shown by his *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 316ff.

> grammar by tacitly assuming that it should be possible to find a unitary logical (psychological) theory for all statements of the same grammatical sort. Thus they wanted to have a unitary theory for all statements which are clothed linguistically in the shape of impersonalia.[40]

Marty still tends to assume that to each single class of judgments there must correspond one single class of grammatical sentences (or at least one optimal type of grammatical realisation), and vice versa. And because of this he believes also that he may safely take his point of departure from the more obvious side of things, i.e. from grammar. Thus he tries to determine the meaning of an expression in order to gain thereby some insight into its logical structure. As a consequence he attempts to establish a unitary logical form wherever a unitary form of grammatical expression is given. To Daubert this twofold weakness of Marty's analyses becomes most palpaple in his polemic against Sigwart. This polemic shows that Marty shares with his opponent the conviction that only one logical account ought to be given for any single set of grammatically similar expressions.

> That their polemic is about the pertinent judgments would presuppose that certain types of judgment in fact correspond to certain types of linguistic formations. But this assumption is completely untenable. Already the fact that I can perform a judgment without having a loud or tacit expression for it (maybe I am looking for it), and moreover the fact that I can express in the same sentence different judgments according to the context of emphasis — this proves the incongruity of language and thought.[41]

The two phenomena to which Daubert points in his argument against Marty's (and Sigwart's) assumption of a more or less close relation between a judgment and its expression — finding words for a judgment and expressing different judgments by uttering the same words in differing intonations — are characteristic of Daubert's own approach. On the one hand someone may run out of words when he tries to describe, e.g., the colour or shape of an object he has seen, or when he is overwhelmed by his emotions in reaction to some event or fact. And on the other hand an utterance like 'A is coming' may, according to a difference of emphasis, either be taken to mean 'It is A (and not B) who is coming' or 'A is coming (and not leaving us in the lurch)'.

[40] A I 10, 'Zum Vortrage', A comparable view is defended in the Bonn PhD dissertation of Karl Schneider, *Zur Kritik der Urteilslehre Franz Brentanos*, Heidelberg 1915, 14: 'There is sufficient agreement among philosophers of all orientations that there exists by no means a total and complete coincidence between language and consciousness . . . But this can mean only that language is poorer than our mental funds of presentation.' In his curriculum vitae, Schneider reports that he studied philosophy in Munich from 1894 to 1899, and afterwards lived there till 1907. It is not however known whether he was in contact with the Munich phenomenologists and whether he knew about Daubert's views on impersonalia and more specifically of Daubert's views on Marty (though it is significant that it is Marty who forms the principal subject of his dissertation).

[41] A I 6/15v.

In both cases we have phenomena which occur almost exclusively in the sphere of communicative speech.[42] And it is because of phenomena of communication that Daubert feels it necessary to draw a much more definite line between logic and language than even Marty was prepared to do.

In particular, Daubert is much more sceptical than Marty about the possibility of presenting a theory covering all cases of impersonal statements. At one point, indeed, he goes so far as to question the possibility of a unified theory of even the limited class of the *verba naturae* (as they were called in the nineteenth century) or, as he himself calls them, 'all statements about meteorological events'.[43] He prefers instead an approach 'from below' (to use Husserl's favourite expression) which performs step by step analyses of given examples of impersonal statements. Marty believes he is entitled rashly to generalize the results of his descriptions and to propose a comprehensive theory because, as Daubert sees it, 'he thinks that it is possible to give one unified theory for all impersonal judgments, notwithstanding his insistence on a separation of logic and grammar'.[44] About the preposterous consequence of such a procedure — which in fact is at odds with Marty's own avowed intentions — Daubert has this to say:

> Marty concedes that 'there is a fire there' may at one time also mean: 'That which I see in the sky is the redness of fire'. But then the formula is said by him to be no longer impersonal. For him after all the meaning of certain forms of expression is at stake. But to ask what the fixed meaning of certain forms of expression is like, carries one to a considerable extent into grammatical and etymological investigations and leads far away from matters of logic.[45]

5. Marty's Theory in Phenomenological Perspective

What this criticism of a supposed one-to-one-relation between grammatical and logical elements in fact amounts to is that, according to Daubert, Marty loses sight of his goal largely because of his broad notion of a 'content of consciousness'. He lacks, as has already been said, a distinct understanding of what the concept of a 'state of affairs' amounts to. It is such states (and not, as in Marty, objects) which according to Daubert function as truth-makers of judgments, and to miss this point is to misconstrue parts of states of affairs either as logical or grammatical parts of judgments and sentences, or as ontological parts of objects.[46]

[42] Interest in such phenomena finally led Daubert and his Munich friends, above all Adolf Reinach, to develop a speech act theory many years before the appearance of Austin's work. See my 'Die Entwicklung der Sprechakttheorie in der Münchener Phänomenologie', *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 21 (1988), 133–166.

[43] A I 10, 'Zum Vortrage'.

[44] A I 6/15v.

[45] A I 6/14r.

[46] See the discussion of 'moments' in Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, 'Truth-Makers', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44 (1984), 287–321.

It should however be noted that the very term 'state of affairs' does not figure prominently in those parts of Daubert's manuscripts of summer 1902 which deal with Marty. But the concept is at work behind his arguments, e.g., in expressions like 'the nature' of the object or its 'being so or so'. Indeed one page in these manuscripts is entitled 'State of Affairs and Object',[47] and Daubert's most extensive criticism of Marty can be understood only on the basis of this concept:

> *It does not matter at all what is actually thought as filling the place of the subject; what matters is only that which is thought there, insofar as it is the subject of the judgment.* Take Marty's own example: 'Someone whose name I do not want to reveal', etc. As a matter of fact I think this someone very concretely, viz. as 'someone whose name I do not want to reveal'. This may have been the reason why people believed that expression was something indispensable [to the judgment] and could not be set aside. They perceived after all that the judgment is something different from the factual psychic act; and that one would get closer to the judgment through the expression and through consideration of the concrete act itself. — Moreover the subject is *determined only by the whole judgment.* 'My house has burnt down': Here [according to Marty] the house is the subject which then by a modifying predicate is transformed into a burnt down house . . . Only the linguistic expression can cause this appearance.[48]

The two statements underlined by Daubert himself are important for understanding his own conception of the meaning of the subject. At first sight, one could be tempted to concede to traditional doctrines that grammatical terms like 'red', 'round' or 'hot' — Marty's real or attributive predicates — do correspond to well-determined parts of the objects, and that their meaning consists in pointing towards these object-parts. But judgments in general do not work in this way — a fact implied also by Marty's doctrine of non-real predicates. The correlate of a judgment is however not, as Marty believes, an object, and therefore there is no necessity to have the terms or parts which make up the judgment, correspond to parts of the object. One could read Marty's distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic signs as containing an implicit recognition of this fact. Drawing on Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Daubert develops, in contrast to Marty's avowed views, the argument that to judgments there must correspond states of affairs which must obtain (or fail to do so), but which can in any case be split up into what one might call conceptual or logical parts.[49] What can be considered to be part of a state of affairs is so only thanks to the whole to which it pertains and from which it is singled out. And correlatively, terms used in judgments

[47] A I 6/16v. That this manuscript belongs to the cluster of Marty manuscripts is shown by the marginal note: 'One-membered judgments; summer vacation 1902'.

[48] A I 6/6v.

[49] For a detailed treatment of this question see Bary Smith, 'On the Cognition of States of Affairs', in Kevin Mulligan (ed.), *Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology*, Dordrecht — Boston — Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff 1987, 189–225.

make sense only as inserted into their judgmental complexes.[50] Names do not possess an independent basic meaning which must first be modified appropriately in order that they be capable of functioning satisfactorily in the context of a judgment. Rather, and in contrast to such atomistic views, priority must be awarded to the judgment as a whole, the structure of which determines the concrete way in which the terms it contains must be understood, and the way the corresponding objects are to be delineated.

Thus, one could say, Marty's theory of 'modifying' predicates becomes modified itself. There exists no univocal term 'the house' which would function normally in a judgment like 'I see the house over there' and in a modified way in 'the house has burnt down'. Rather, 'the house' in both judgments functions in a way that differs according to the difference between the two states of affairs corresponding to 'I see a house' and 'a house has burnt down'.

What, then, does it mean to say that these two states of affairs involve two different objects, viz. the house over there and a burnt down house? Their difference cannot be understood as that between a real house and a kind of ideal house-noema we are directed at or 'have in mind' as an intentional or immanent object. The phenomenological device of taking into consideration the correlation between what is given objectively and the psychic acts in which it is given is applied by Daubert in this case, too. The difference between the destroyed house and the fact that it has burnt down, is to him a difference of acts directed towards one and the same thing. It is a difference of attitudes with which given things may be apprehended. It is the way in which we take a stand which determines whether objects are formed into states of affairs or grasped precisely as objects. The aspects a judgment may take into account are of course prefigured by the structures the objects exhibit, but it is consciousness with its acts and dispositions which is responsible for picking out certain phenomena, concentrating on them, and bringing them, with greater or lesser prominence, into relation with other phenomena. Generally houses are experienced as inhabitable buildings. With regard to a smouldering heap of bricks we will judge 'the house has burnt down' only in case we pay attention to certain structures which remind us, for example, of the house we remember having seen at this place, i.e. if we insert a given phenomenon into a larger context of psychic acts. Or we could also simply judge: 'This is a ruin'.

In Daubert's view Marty did not distinguish adequately between the object (as correlate of perception, of memory or of nominal acts) and the states of affairs (the correlates of judging acts) it is involved in. Daubert himself gives an example of what this means in his discussion of the debate between Marty and Sigwart. Both had determined the meaning of expressions like 'Socrates is (not) ill' by reflecting upon what 'Socrates' refers to and discussing only

[50] In this sense Daubert agrees with Wittgenstein: 'Only the proposition has a sense; only in the context of a proposition does a name have a meaning.' (*Tractatus* 3.3).

afterwards what 'is (not) ill' does mean. But this is, Daubert comments, 'to play with linguistic forms'. Marty and Sigwart agree that 'Socrates is ill' implies Socrates' real existence. 'Socrates is not ill' does so for Sigwart, too, while for the early Marty this judgment leaves his reality undecided, stating only that there is no Socrates-who-would-be-ill. On Daubert's view, however, it makes no sense to decide about the real existence of Socrates on the basis and in the context of these two judgments which only affirm his (not) being thus or so. For neither of these judgments *focuses* on his being real; they are about quite different states of affairs. In general, when uttering one of these two judgments, we have the historical Socrates in mind (who in fact existed at a given time).[51] Thus Daubert comments: 'reality may here be presupposed as self-evident, but in the judgment itself it is irrelevant'. 'Socrates is ill' could not be translated into 'A Socrates who is not ill does not exist', even if the two judgments were somehow equivalent. For the switch from the one to the other tacitly introduces a change of judgmental attitude: it signifies a turn to another issue, the issue of reality. The same applies to a judgment like 'snow is white' which Marty similarly translated into 'there exists no non-white snow'. But, Daubert argues, 'these judgments would be equivalent only when we reflect upon reality'.[52]

Another way of expressing the difference of judging attitudes is to distinguish 'between actual and potential judgments, i.e. between that which is judged upon, and that which I therein presuppose as being self-evident or subordinate'. Marty's 'question concerning reality', Daubert affirms, can be solved by this distinction.[53] It is not, as both Marty and Sigwart believe, by probing into the properties of the object which has become the subject of our judgment that we can decide about the degree to which real existence is involved in this judgment. This becomes possible only when we turn towards other judgments connected with it by way of identification. It is only because we take it for granted that a judgment about Socrates' possible illness refers to identically the same Athenian — whom we identify as the son of Sophroniscus, as the teacher of Plato etc., and with whom we associate dozens of other historical judgments — that the dispute between Marty and Sigwart makes sense.

Against this view one might argue that it would still remain possible to decide about the truth of one or other of the two conflicting judgments concerning Socrates' illness, if he only occurred in a context other than the historical one, for example if all judgments about him together constituted a novel. This would however be no counter-argument, but rather an extension of the Daubertian theory. And indeed Daubert himself exploits this possibility of transposing the isolated judgment into various compounds of other

[51] Daubert here evidently draws on Husserl's distinction between 'positing' and 'non-positing' names as worked out in the Fifth Logical Investigation (*Husserliana* XIX/1, 480ff.).

[52] A I 19, Marty excerpt (p. 19 of Daubert's pagination).

[53] *Ibid.* (p. 15).

judgments (or narratives and discourses) in which its value changes. Returning once more to Marty's example of the centaur, he remarks:

> But I reject its validity only insofar as I try to think the centaur as a real being. At another time I can perfectly well say: 'centaurs exist'. We imagine them, paint them, they are beings well-known to us . . .[54]

> The existential judgment cannot always refer to one single type of existence. Take the example 'a centaur does not exist'. This judgment denies its existence only in the sense of actual reality, but not in the sense of a subjective or mythological one . . . Therefore if one says 'a centaur', we at once conceive the correct idea. And if then it is added 'it does not exist', we also know what is meant, viz. that it is no really existing thing.[55]

Daubert does not rest content, however, with this affirmation that it is only because of the necessary insertion of judgments into complexes of judgments that we can analyse them.

Marty, it is true, had shown that an adequate description of the judgment has to take into account the standpoint, not only of the speaker, but also of the hearer of a sentence: a judgment, he had said in his third article, not only refers to something objective, it also manifests the presence of a certain judgmental content in the speaker and it intends to arouse the same content in the hearer. Daubert of course hails this insight into the communicative character of speech. But he still considers Marty's doctrine to be insufficient. To recur to the phenomena of intimation and communication for the sake of determining the identical judgmental content is to use this aspect only as a means towards an end which lies beyond intimation itself. But Daubert insists that the natural place of judgment is communicative speech.

In this field also the already mentioned phenomena of emphasis come to the fore. They show the inadequacy of any consideration of linguistic forms as unequivocal. Moreover it is usually the case that there enter into the flow of speech also extralinguistic factors — alluding to Marty one could call them

[54] A I 19, 'Brentano und seine Schule'.

[55] A I 7, 'Eingliedrige Urteile'. The Brentanists had affirmed that all presentations dispose of an intentional object immanent to the presentation itself. Such immanent objects do not, to be sure, enjoy real existence, yet they 'exist' in a modified sense of existence which is called intentional existence (see especially Kasimir Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, Vienna: Alfred Hölder 1894, 24f.). Against this theory of intentional objects existing in a modified way, Husserl had argued that, in case the object intended by a presentation exists, it is this very existing object and not an additional intentional one that is intended; and in case this object does not exist (a centaur, for example), it does not exist at all, neither in reality nor (in whichever modified sense) 'in' the representation (*Logische Untersuchungen*, Fifth Investigation, *Husserliana* XIX/1, 386f. and 438f.). Seen against this background, it seems doubtful that Daubert in his Marty manuscripts would have taken over Husserl's position. His talk of the centaur's 'subjective' existence which is due to its being imagined, rather suggests that on this point he follows the general Brentanist doctrine subscribed to not only by Brentano and Twardowski, but also by Marty.

'outer forms of speech' — which play an important role in helping us to 'make our ideas clear' (as Peirce puts it) to other persons. One only has to think of indexicals and the like, which receive their definite meaning only in the given context:

> Especially in sentences with a subject which grammatically remains undetermined, a good deal is left to emphasis and to the situation in which these sentences are uttered . . . It makes no sense at all to want to ascertain a well-determined logical meaning for a certain grammatical form of expression. This is so because a grammatical form (a sentence, e.g.) does not stand up to being isolated in the same way a mathematical formula does. Context and emphasis are as important as the formula itself.[56]

The impersonalia, too, at least according to certain interpretations, belong among the sentences with a grammatically undetermined subject. Their consideration, we now must concede, has brought us close to the fields not only of psychology or grammar, but also of society, history and novel. All this may seem to have led us far away from Marty's interest in subjectless sentences. But in all those cases in which Daubert goes beyond him there is at least some germ of Daubert's views to be found in Marty's analyses themselves. Marty's discussions of existence vs. reality show that he was well aware of the necessity to divide existential judgments into sub-classes, and thus to move to a level of detail and concreteness on which alone the relevant problems can be fruitfully tackled. Marty's delimitation of that intriguing group of predicates which he calls modifying predicates also makes it clear that the description of apparently widely differing examples is inevitable for any progress in the logic of two-membered judgments. But above all the importance of Marty's articles on subjectless sentences consists, at least in retrospect, in his having been one of the first to show how problems appear in a new light if one takes into account the seemingly trivial fact that acts of judgment usually involve their intimation in speech and communication. It is Daubert's merit to have taken up these suggestions, to have worked them out for himself, and to have seen that they could make their way into some of the best work of early Munich phenomenology.[57]

[56] A I 10, 'Zum Vortrage'.

[57] Cf. Barry Smith, 'Materials Towards a History of Speech Act Theory', 125–152.